

# Education

## Lectures 11 and 12

Le Grand, Propper and Smith (2008): Chp 3

Bochel, Bochel, Page and Sykes (2009): Chp 11

Stiglitz (2000): Chp 16

# Outline

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- Social objectives of education
  - efficiency
  - equity
- Education and the market system
- Forms of Govt intervention
- Education Reforms

# Education and Resource Allocation

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- Education and Efficiency

- Maximise net social benefit

- Measuring education benefits

1. Production benefits

- Investment and future productivity

2. Socialisation benefits

- Transmission of knowledge

- Socialisation function v home education

## Education and Equity

- Equitable distribution

- Definition of Equity

1. Minimum level

2. Equal access

3. Equality of opportunity

# Education and the Market System

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- Investment in human capital
  - Costs v future returns
- Education costs
  - Direct costs
  - Opportunity cost of income forego
- Education as an Inv decision
  - eg university education
  - Costs: areas A + B
  - Benefits: area C
    - ⇒ if NPV is positive,  
invest in human capital

## Education benefits

- Future productivity



Figure 1 **Time Profile of Cost and Benefit Flows**

# Education and the Market System (contd)

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- If returns to education are high
  - ⇒ Students: willing and able to finance studies and repay later
- Advantages of the market system
  - Preferences and choice
  - Availability of efficient education system
- Why government assistance?
- Education and inefficiency
  - Imperfect information
  - Externalities

# Education and the Market System I: Imperfect Information

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- 1. Supply-side: borrowing requirements
  - Low-income groups, no collateral
    - ⇒ high-risk premium favours the well-off
  - adverse selection problem
    - ⇒ lending is inefficiently low
  
- 2. Demand-side: decision-making
  - A complex process
    - ⇒ under-estimate the value of education and over-estimate the costs
    - ⇒ **debt-aversion** to financing education
  
- Education determines job prospects & quality of life
  - ⇒ minimise potential for individual mistakes

# Education and the Market System II: External Benefits

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- Total social benefit = private benefits + external benefits  
⇒ Market provision is inefficient
- 1. Economic benefits
  - Employment benefits: co-operation and overall productivity  
eg efficient management and supervision
  - Production benefits: technological progress and growth  
– eg flexibility and adaptability
- 2. Non-economic benefits
  - Socialisation function
- How to measure external benefits?

# Higher Education (HE) and Signalling

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- How to distinguish productive v unproductive workers?
  - Screening hypothesis
    - HE is a proxy for innate skills and abilities
  - a. Strong form
    - HE has no effect on individual productivity
    - A signal to employer that the individual is productive
  - b. Weak form
    - Skilled individuals invest in HE to ↑ appeal to employers
    - HE raises individual productivity; social returns > private returns
- ⇒ HE is merely a signal of ability
- ⇒ Govt intervention questionable
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# Education and the Market System III: Equity

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- Non-investment in education is a rational decision
  - Low-income households
  - Credit-constrained and inability to borrow
  - Less knowledgeable of future benefits
    - ⇒ Perpetuated across generations
  
- ⇒ Govt intervention: equity and efficiency goals
  - Compulsory education
  - Higher education

# Govt Policy: Compulsory Education Reforms

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- UK system 1945-1990
  - Finance education from general taxation.
  - Provide education free of charge
  - Limited private education
- Reforms
  - Maintain free education
  - Individual choice, reward school numbers, public information
- 1. Quasi-markets
  - Open enrolment
  - Following the pupil
  - School performance is public information
- 2. Education voucher
  - Entitles an individual to pay for a given quantity of education services
  - Schools redeem vouchers from the govt for a cash sum

# Compulsory Education Reforms: Issues

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- 1. School choice and school behaviour
  - Exam performance, league tables and ‘gaming the system’  
...but broader educational goals  
...and incentives to massage the data
  - Policy: contextual value added
- 2. School choice and efficiency
  - Supply side flexibility
  - Financial implications of student numbers
  - Policy: lottery scheme to prevent over-subscribed popular schools
- 3. School choice and equity
  - Low-income families: quality and duration of education

# Govt Policy: Higher Education (HE)

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- Link between education and growth?
- Substantial private returns
- Variable govt intervention
- 1. Traditional model of state provision and state funding
  - Public sector universities
  - Entrance exam
  - Free of charge
  - Student grants
- 2. Cost-sharing
  - Costs of provision
  - High private returns
  - Market incentives for providers

# Financing HE I: Grants

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- UK attendance in HE relatively low but increasing
- Free education & non-repayable maintenance grant
- In favour of grants
  - equalise access
  - ...but in reality: favours the well-off
- Against grants
  - unrelated to cost of study
  - unrelated to future income
  - stage of education v EMA

# Financing HE II: Loans

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- Loans system
  - Recipient bears the costs and re-distributes the burden over time
- In favour of loans
  - equity: repayable loans reduce lifetime income inequality
  - efficiency: private costs and student responsibility
- Against loans
  - 1. lower appeal of low-paid jobs
    - ⇒ Response: **income contingent loans** at subsidised or zero interest rate
  - 2. inequality of access v consumption expenditure
    - ⇒ Response: income contingent loans
    - ⇒ Additional targeted policies eg maintenance grant or write off loans in low-paid jobs or loan remission
  - 3. govt exp unreleased for alternative uses for many years

# Financing HE III: Graduate Taxes

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- Extra tax paid over entire working life if complete education
  - In favour of graduate tax
    - As with loans, recipient pays tax v grants (all taxpayers)
    - Cheaper to administer v loans
    - Related to future income v grants
  - Against graduate tax
    - Unrelated to cost of study
    - Disincentives to work
- ⇒ economic efficiency: loans are preferred
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# Provision of HE: Reforms

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- Regulation of prices charged by HE universities
- 1. Fee charging in the UK since 1998
  - Same fee for all subjects and Universities until 2003
  - Promotes equality of access
    - ...but incentives to improve standards?
- Market reform and efficiency
  - Free(er) to set own fees: price signals
  - Demand-side: allocation of resources between courses
  - Supply-side: improved standards v flat fees: **price ceiling** or **price floor**
- 2. Variable fees
  - Universities differ in quality
  - Equity concerns: scholarships to be widespread and generous



# Summary

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- Efficiency: productivity and social benefits
- Equity: minimum standard and equality of access
- Markets: increase choice
  - ...but imperfect information and externalities impede efficiency aim
  - ...inability to pay and unequal distribution impede equity aim
- Dissatisfaction with traditional provision and subsidies
- Policy response: combine equity goals & market mechanisms
  - Compulsory education: lottery and student voucher
  - HE: student loans and targeted grants