Behavioral Economics is a draft of the opening chapter of C Camerer, G Loewenstein and M Rabin (eds)(2003) Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton University Press. It covers the main heuristics and judgement biases revealed by psychological experiments and statistical surveys on choice, and the implications for macroeconomics, financial economics, labour economics and other areas where 'rational' choice is traditionally assumes.
Online Text and Notes in Structural and Institutional Economics
Formerly the European School of New Institutional Economic (ESNIE), the IOEA website includes 'Archives' sections with downloadable papers and slides from presentations made to ESNIE institutional economics conferences and other events; authors include Oliver Williamson, Sidney Winter, Richard Langlois.
This is a special issue of Finance and Development (March 2006), produced by the IMF, with non-technical papers on economic growth in a development context. Papers emphasise the plurality of definitions and theories of growth, but also address practical development strategy issues.
Institutional Economics site containing links to course outlines for 30+ institutional, behavioural and heterodox economics courses, mostly in the US. Online access to Allan Schmid's working papers, and book 'Property, Power and Public Choice' (in English and Spanish). This argues the general case for countries' economic performance being affected the institutions that shape agents' choices and governments' policymaking, then sets out (and offers some secondary empirical support for) some hypotheses on the impact of different property rights arrangements.
This is a webpage supporting a course on Institutional and Behavioural Economics as taught by David Schweikhardt and A. Allan Schmid at Michigan State University in 2006.It covers topics such as: collective action, public choice, property rights, agency, transaction-information costs, behavioural theory of the firm-consumers-government, externalities, income distribution, order, evolution, learning, uncertainty, legitimation, altruism. Materials include handouts of lecture presentations, suggested readings and texts.
Extensive notes on Acemoglu and Robinson's lectures on institutional political economy as applied to development, which form a proptotype for their recent book on 'Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.' Makes extensive use of economic models, but text should also be of interest to economic historians, political economists and political scientists.